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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the history of electronic surveillance for national security
purposes within the United States and relates the statutory and constitutional law to the
current, post September 11th practices. An extensive examination of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and the recently leaked, classified Terrorist Surveillance
Program shows that the FISA Court, within its narrow jurisdiction, adequately accounts
for constitutional standards, yet the TSP—including recent reforms—is in clear violation
of constitutional and statutory law.
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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history of the United States there exists a constant struggle
between individual liberties and national security. Attacks from abroad often increase the
need to strengthen national security, yet this increase leaves open the potential for
government to erode certain freedoms. This includes the Fourth Amendment, which
proclaims, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” 1 This particular
protection continues to be the forefront in the struggle between national security and
individual freedom. The Fourth Amendment symbolizes “the uniqueness of American
freedom and the centrality of the concept of the rule of law and the sovereignty of the
people.” 2 Thus the Fourth Amendment is vital to the American system of democracy and
it is necessary to keep the government from intruding, without cause, on the privacy of its
citizens.
Yet intrusion is not always the simple act of government officials entering into
private property. In recent history the protections found in the Forth Amendment have
also adapted with changes in technology. Federal law enforcement officers have been
able to use electronic surveillance as a tool to investigate citizens since the advent of
electronic communication, and the legal community has adjusted its interpretation of the
1

2

U.S. Constitution. Amend. IX.

Samuel Dash. The Intruders: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures from King John to John
Ashcroft. (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 2004), 6.

2
Fourth Amendment with the changing times. When a national crisis arises however, the
desire for stronger national security often reopens the debate to what forms of electronic
surveillance are acceptable.
The events following September 11th were no exception. In fact, recent events
show that significant constitutional issues have arisen within the jurisprudence of
electronic surveillance policy. On January 18, 2007, the Department of Justice announced
that the National Security Agency’s controversial, warrantless electronic surveillance
program, often referred to as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, would be brought under
the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 3 Some journalists asserted
that this new announcement was an “an abrupt reversal by the administration” in their
policies of electronic surveillance on domestic soil. 4 Yet after careful examination of the
change in policy, it is clear that many questions still remain as to the constitutionality of
the TSP. This paper will argue that the administration’s policy does not end the statutory
and constitutional violations of the TSP. This argument will be conducted in four steps:
first, an extensive examination of the jurisprudence of electronic surveillance will be
examined to lay foundation for the debate; second, it will be argued that an appropriate,
constitutional balance was achieved with the passage of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act and the subsequent establishment of the FISA Court; next, the
constitutionality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will be addressed; and finally,
various solutions to bring electronic surveillance policy back into the realm of
constitutionality will be suggested.

3

Dan Eggen. 2007. “Court Will Oversee Wiretapping Program: Change Does Not Settle Qualms
about Privacy.” The Washington Post, January 18. A01.
4

Ibid.
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CHAPTER ONE: DEFINING A NEW KIND OF SEARCH

Before examining the present day Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the
NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program an extensive examination into the history of
electronic surveillance jurisprudence is necessary to establish how these two entities
relate to the Fourth Amendment. Practically parallel to the advent of a system of
electronic communication, electronic surveillance has been a tool of the executive since
the late 19th century. This tool was first used in a national security setting in instances
where the Union Army intercepted Confederate telegraphs. 5 As communication
technology evolved, so did the ability to intercept communication, yet, by the early
1900s, there was no legal standard established on the subject of electronic surveillance.
The Justice Department reports that the first time any Attorney General considered
wiretapping for either law enforcement or intelligence purposes was in 1924. Attorney
General Harlan Fiske Stone prohibited the use of wiretapping on ethical bounds and law
enforcement officers in the Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of
Investigation) were restricted from using wiretaps for any purpose. 6
This decision, however, was not a legal one and remained an internal Justice
Department guideline. Thus it did not prevent other Cabinet departments from engaging

5

6

Berger v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

“Church Committee Report.” U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans. 94th Congress. 1st Session. April 23, 1976.
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in wiretapping. This included the Department of Treasury, which at that time was
actively investigating violators of the National Prohibition Act. The Bureau of
Prohibitions—then a part of Treasury—was the lead entity in arresting bootleggers and
did not shy away from the use of electronic surveillance, whether ethical or not. 7 One
bootlegger who was subject to such surveillance was a man by the name of Roy
Olmstead.
In Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court issued its first ruling on how
electronic surveillance relates to the rights established by the Fourth Amendment. The
case began with the arrest of Roy Olmstead and eleven of his conspirators. Olmstead had
managed a bootlegging operation within the state of Washington and, in the course of
their investigation, law enforcement officers—without entering the building—wiretapped
Olmstead’s office. Over the course of many months the officers obtained the information
needed to arrest Olmstead and this information was used as evidence to convict him.
Olmstead appealed his conviction, asserting that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
had been violated. 8
The Court issued its ruling on June 4, 1928. In it Chief Justice William Howard
Taft argues that Olmstead’s rights were not violated due to the conduct of his
conversation and the nature of the process of electronic surveillance. Justice Taft first
asserts that “there is no room in the present case for applying the Fifth Amendment,
unless the Fourth Amendment was first violated,” because Olmstead was not compelled
to communicate with his telephone by law enforcement officers. Therefore, Justice Taft

7

“Church Committee Report.”

8

Olmstead v. United States. 279 U.S. 849 (1929).

5
continues, “consideration must be confined to the Fourth Amendment.” 9 In considering
the Fourth Amendment, the Court found that wiretapping did not constitute a search as
defined by the Amendment. The Court frames its justification with an examination of
cases where searches were physically conducted and then compares them with the
Olmstead case where there is “testimony only of voluntary conversations secretly
overheard.” 10 The Court did recognize that, in order to consider wiretapping a search, the
legal definition of the phrase “search and seizure” would have to evolve with the
advances of modern technology. But Chief Justice Taft—with four other justices
concurring—was not ready to make this leap. Since there was no physical invasion of
“tangible material effects,” 11 the Court did not consider wiretapping to be a Fourth
Amendment search.
With four justices dissenting, this opinion, while a majority, was not strongly
supported. This not only indicates that Olmstead was a narrow ruling, but that, with four
justices behind it, the dissenting opinions could eventually evolve into a new type of
Fourth Amendment search. Justice Louis D. Brandeis, as one of these justices, “entered a
powerful dissent.” 12 He argues that the Fourth Amendment has never had “unduly literal
construction” 13 placed upon it. Furthermore, he argues—with the other dissenting justices
echoing his call—that the Constitution must evolve with a changing society and that
9

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

11

Ibid.

12

Erin L Brown. “ECHELON: The National Security Agency's Compliance with Applicable
Legal Guidelines in Light of the Need for Tighter National Security.” CommLaw Conspectus. 2003. 1
CommLaw Conspectus 185.
13

Olmstead v. United States. Brandeis dissent.
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evolution must include changes in technology. 14 If technology allows for government to
circumvent the literal interpretation of the Constitution through electronic surveillance,
then, Justice Brandeis argues, interpretation of the Constitution should uphold the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Over time, society would continue to evolve, and as it did,
the legal arena of electronic surveillance would eventually reform to Justice Brandeis’s
standards.
In the aftermath of Olmstead, the use of information obtained by electronic
surveillance in court without a warrant was constitutionally permissive. Even so, state
and federal investigations only made sporadic use of this power. For example, Congress
passed the Federal Communications Act in 1934 which prohibited wiretapping and,
although it was interpreted to allow for some use by federal agents, the Justice
Department still considered the practice unethical. 15 With the advent of World War II,
however, the use of electronic surveillance within the United States for national security
purposes grew and “did not wane with the end of the war.” 16
By the 1950s the Federal Bureau of Investigation had grown considerably due to
its importance in national security intelligence during World War II. The Bureau’s
development as an entity eventually led to its evolution into an “autonomous agency,
independent of both the president and attorney general.” 17 It was in this era when the
FBI’s wiretapping practices expanded as the Justice Department now concluded that the
14

Brown, “ECHELON.”

15

“Church Committee Report.”

16

Robert N Davis. “Striking the Balance: National Security vs. Civil Liberties.” Brooklyn Journal
of International Law. 2003. 29 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 175.
17

Athan Theoharis. “FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy.” Political
Science Quarterly. Vol. 107. No 1. (Spring 1992). Pg 104.
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Federal Communications Act “did not apply to federal agents.” 18 The use of wiretaps
increased dramatically and the FBI began to use this surveillance for investigatory,
national security and even political purposes. 19
With electronic surveillance becoming a greater tool in law enforcement, the
constitutionality of the practice of wiretapping once again came before the Supreme
Court. In 1961 the Supreme Court heard the case Silverman v. United States and ruled
that when federal agents physically intrude on a person’s home to record conversations,
they violate the Fourth Amendment. 20 Six years later the case Berger v. New York (1967)
reached the Court and the justices’ interpretation of electronic surveillance took a large
step towards Justice Brandeis’s view of evolving with society. The Court examined a
bribery case where state law enforcement officers obtained judicial approval for a
specific form of electronic surveillance known as “bugging.” This instance did not
involve the wiretapping of a phone line but instead the eavesdropping of a conversation
through electronic means. The Court ruled that this instance—while it did have judicial
approval—still failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard. 21 Unlike
any case before it, in Berger the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment must apply to
instances of electronic surveillance because the recorded conversations used in the
conviction was a search and seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment.
Six months later, the final case that brought an end to the Olmstead precedent
finally applied this justification to the use of wiretapping within law enforcement
18

Ibid.

19

Ibid 105.

20

Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).

21

Berger v. New York. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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investigations. In Katz v. United States (1967), the Supreme Court examined a case where
the defendant’s phone conversation in a public telephone booth was wiretapped and the
recording was used to convict him at trial. While the defendant and the government
founded their arguments on whether public property was constitutionally protected, the
Court took on the issue from a different angle. The Court asserts that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places” and thus the issue of constitutionality rests on
the concept of privacy and not on the physical location of the defendant. The Court
begins its ruling by clarifying that the Fourth Amendment “cannot be translated into a
general constitutional ‘right to privacy’” but instead protects individuals’ privacy against
certain types of governmental intrusion. 22 When examining the Katz case, the Court held
that what a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.” 23 Any conversation that an individual seeks to keep
private is constitutionally protected and, by recording these conversations, the
government performs a search and seizure as defined by the Fourth Amendment.
The question of when one’s communication is deemed private and thus falls under
the protection of the Fourth Amendment is outlined in Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion. This concurrence “provided an important test for a reasonable expectation of
privacy in regard to Fourth Amendment protections” which has “remained in effect to
this day.” 24 Justice Harlan’s test broke the issue of privacy into two parts: first, the
individual must have demonstrated an actual expectation of privacy; second, this

22

Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).

23

Ibid.

24

Brown, “ECHELON.”
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expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 25 This
reasonableness standard in Justice Harlan’s test opens the door to the reality that “the
legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions” to normal Fourth
Amendment warrants.26
This need for exceptions to the general warrant rule was recognized in Katz’s
majority opinion, with particular emphasis on national security. Footnote 23 of the
Court’s ruling specifically states, “Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a
magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case.” 27 Clearly, the Court left open the
question of whether or not electronic surveillance of national security issues required
judicial approval. There was even disagreement among the members as to how national
security issues should be handled. In his concurring opinion, Justice White elaborates on
the need for a national security exception. He contends that the President and the
Attorney General should have sole discretion when deciding what constitutes a national
security matter. Justice Douglas attacks this view, however, stating that Justice White’s
interpretation of footnote 23 would give an “unwarranted green light for the Executive
Branch” to conduct any electronic surveillance under the guise of national security. 28
Regardless of the ambiguity found in Justices White and Douglas’ dicta on the
national security exception, the Katz opinion became the bedrock of electronic
surveillance jurisprudence. Congress quickly enacted legislation to establish a process for
25

Katz v. United States. Justice Harlan’s concurrence.

26

Ibid.

27

Katz v. United States.

28

Katz v. United States. Justice Douglas’s concurrence.

10
law enforcement to obtain warrants for electronic surveillance that abided by the
constitutional requirements prevalent in the Fourth Amendment. The Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 defined the bureaucratic procedures to protect the
constitutional rights guaranteed to citizens in Katz. The executive’s authority to conduct
electronic surveillance in matters of national security, however, continued unchecked as
the act “expressly indicated that it was not intended to interfere with the executive
authority of the President” when related to national security. 29 Therefore, when it came to
instances of national security, the executive remained immune from the procedural
restrictions of judicial scrutiny.

29

Davis. “Striking the Balance.”
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CHAPTER TWO: EXPLOITING NATIONAL SECURITY

This avenue for wiretapping without judicial and legislative oversight would not
remain open for long, however, as certain events caused both the Supreme Court and
Congress to begin to examine this issue more stringently. The first instance of applying
Forth Amendment standards to wiretapping for national security reasons came in the case
United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. It
became known among legal scholars as the Keith case because the government filed a
writ of mandamus challenging the decision by then District Judge Damon J. Keith. 30
Judge Keith had ordered the government to disclose the transcripts of warrantless
electronic surveillance information related to national security. The case involved three
individuals indicted for conspiracy to destroy Government property. One of the
defendants was also charged with the dynamite bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency
office building. This defendant moved to have the government disclose the recorded
conversations and also moved to hold hearings to determine whether these recordings
“tainted” the evidence found in the indictment. 31 This was the first time that the national
security exception to the Fourth Amendment procedural protections had reached the
Supreme Court. In essence, the Court was asked to take up the debate that Justices White
and Douglas had engaged in with their concurrences in Katz.

30

John Cary Sims. “What NSA Is Doing ... and Why It's Illegal.” Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly. Winter / Spring, 2006. 33 Hastings Const. L.Q. 105.
31

United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan et al. 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
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The Court, in its opinion, held that footnote 23 of Katz and the national security
exceptions in Title III were not grounds for complete disregard for Fourth Amendment
protections. The Court found that “official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal
investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally
protected privacy of speech.” 32 Such a risk, the Court argues, does “not justify departure
in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial approval prior
to initiation of a search or surveillance.” 33 Clearly, with the ruling in the Keith case, the
national security exception in electronic surveillance practices shrunk significantly.
This exception, however, was not completely eliminated. The Court had ruled
within the context of the Keith case, only in reference to situations where domestic
organizations threaten national security. The Court was quick to point out the limits this
ruling had when applied to electronic surveillance levied against foreign threats. The
ruling makes sure to note that the Court is not addressing the issue “with respect to
activities of foreign powers or their agents.” 34 The Court further argues “that warrantless
surveillance, though impermissible in domestic security cases, may be constitutional
where foreign powers are involved.” 35 Once again the Court extended the application of
Fourth Amendment protections in the realm of electronic surveillance law, yet left open a
door for the executive to continue some form of surveillance free from judicial scrutiny.
In fact, for many years after the Keith case, the attorney general was allowed to
“authorize surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers without any court
32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.
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review.” 36 Congress, however, eventually discovered this exception also led to many
forms of executive abuse. This led to a political atmosphere that was finally ready for
establishing Article III checks on all forms of electronic surveillance.
In response to this executive branch abuse Congress, in 1976, began to investigate
the possibility of executive misuse of electronic surveillance by creating the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
referred to as the Church Committee after Senator Frank Church. On April 23, 1976, the
Church Committee issued a report which, in part, outlined various instances of executive
misconduct within the realm of electronic surveillance practices. The committee noted
that after the ruling in the Keith case restricting most forms of warrantless electronic
surveillance, “all existing warrantless electronic surveillances were directed against
foreigners.” 37 This demonstrates that the executive branch had now ceased all warrantless
surveillance previously allowed before the ruling in Keith. This did not, however, prove
that there was no abuse of electronic surveillance policy. The committee also noted that
the proportion of foreign targets had grown significantly after the Keith ruling, 38
indicating that the executive was utilizing the foreign powers exception in order to
circumvent judicial scrutiny.
This abuse was not limited to one party or one president. The committee offered
examples of multiple administrations improperly applying the foreign powers exception.
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy authorized the surveillance of Congressmen in their
36

The 9/11 Commission Report. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States. July 22, 2004. Public Law 107-306. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm. Pg 78.
37

“Church Committee Report.”

38

Ibid.
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negotiations with foreign officials on sugar quota proposals, an action clearly not related
to the protection of national security. Kennedy also authorized wiretaps on the residence
and office of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. merely on the bases that two of his associates
may have been associated with the Communist Party. 39 The Kennedy Administration was
not the only one to engage in questionable electronic surveillance policy. President
Lyndon Johnson personally told the FBI to inform him on foreign officials’ contact with
Congressmen. This directly resulted in the electronic surveillance “of each Senator,
Representative, or staff member who communicated with selected foreign
establishments.” 40 One documented incident also showed that, at the request of President
Johnson, the FBI “instituted an electronic surveillance of a foreign target for the purpose
of intercepting telephone conversations of a particular American citizen.” 41
These practices continued under President Richard Nixon; the administration
informed the FBI that they “wanted any information … relating to contacts between
[certain foreign officials] and Members of Congress and its staff.” 42 Furthermore, the
Nixon administration used these exceptions to justify “his departures from electronic
surveillance law. In the wake of these discoveries, Congress determined that additional
statutory protections were needed to close the loopholes in Title III.” 43

39

Ibid.

40

Ibid.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.

43

Grayson A. Hoffman. “Litigating Terrorism: The New FISA Regime, the Wall, and the Fourth
Amendment.” American Criminal Law Review. Fall, 2003. 40 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1655.
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Clearly, these violations show that misuse of executive electronic surveillance
was widespread throughout the 1960s and 1970s. This misconduct continued in every
administration, regardless of party affiliation. Not only was the Fourth Amendment
privacy of multiple U.S. persons violated by the executive’s actions, but “moreover, the
use of warrantless electronic surveillance against… attorneys, Congressmen and
Congressional staff members, and journalists, has revealed an insensitivity to the values
inherent in the Sixth Amendment and the doctrines of ‘separation of powers’ and
‘freedom of the press’.” 44 The fact that these actions were not well-intended attempts at
protecting national security but instead complex conspiracies to spy on political
opponents shows that any form of electronic surveillance without judicial authorization
undoubtedly has direct harm on the American system of democracy.

44

“Church Committee Report.”
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CHAPTER THREE: CHECKING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

Given the prevalent abuse of electronic surveillance by the executive branch, the
Church Committee supported a piece of legislation which had already been introduced
into Congress. 45 This law would designate federal judges to find probable cause that a
suspect is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power before electronic surveillance
could be initiated. The Church Committee considered this solution to be a “significant
step towards effective regulation of FBI electronic surveillance.” 46
Based upon this Church Committee recommendation, Congress blocked the final
avenue for warrantless electronic surveillance. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
was passed in 1978. “This law regulated intelligence collection directed at foreign powers
and agents of foreign powers in the United States” and brought the only remaining
avenue for warrantless electronic surveillance under Article III jurisdiction. 47 Some legal
scholars contend that “FISA represents an effort by the political branches to promote
judicial involvement in fighting threats to the national security.” 48 While it is true that
FISA includes the judiciary in the process of protecting national security, it is important
to recognize that the true foundation of FISA “was a reaction to executive branch abuses

45

“Church Committee Report.”

46

Ibid.

47

The 9/11 Commission Report. Pg 78.

48

John C. Yoo. “Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism.” The George Washington Law
Review. December, 2003. 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427.

17
of civil liberties.” 49 Congress recognized that a response to the multiple Fourth
Amendment violations found by the Church Committee was needed; this new
legislation—while including the judiciary into the realm of national security—was
established solely to provide an Article III check on the executive’s wiretapping
authority.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act took specific steps to provide a check
on the executive’s electronic surveillance in matters of foreign affairs and eliminated the
practice of electronic surveillance without judicial approval. First the Act established a
judicial entity to oversee all electronic surveillance not covered under Title III
protections. Thus the area of electronic surveillance not covered by the Keith case—
foreign powers or agents of foreign powers—were brought under the jurisdiction of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. This Court consists of judges from various
federal district courts publicly appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to
serve nonrenewable seven year terms. 50
In order to engage in electronic surveillance, the government must receive
approval from this Court by meeting specific standards laid out in the Act. The
government must demonstrate “probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 51 The statute further
defines the terms “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power,” relating them to
espionage and international terrorism. FISA also establishes notice and suppression
49

Davis. “Striking the Balance.”

50

Rebecca A. Copeland. “War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines
of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America.” Texas Tech Law Review. 35 Tex. Tech L. Rev.
1. (2004).
51

50 U.S.C. 1805 (18) (I).
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requirements different than traditional Title III requirements and dictated that the foreign
intelligence must be the primary purpose of the surveillance. 52
With the passage of FISA, Congress restricted the final avenue open to the
executive for obtaining domestic electronic surveillance without a court order. This new
system for electronic surveillance of foreign powers then began to evolve within the
bureaucratic structure. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Department of Justice created
“procedures limiting contact between foreign intelligence agents in the FBI and federal
prosecutors. Those procedures … produced what the public came to call ‘the wall.’” 53
This system was created to comply with the “primary purpose” standard set out in FISA.
The Department of Justice concluded that if foreign intelligence agents who used FISA
proceeding in gathering intelligence were not able to collaborate with criminal
prosecutors then those agents would always meet the primary purpose standard. Yet, as it
was only Justice Department policy and not a statutory mandate, this “wall” separating
shared intelligence between foreign intelligence and law enforcement agents was a
bureaucratic construction and, while recognized as acceptable procedure by some lower
courts, was never constitutionally mandated by Congress or the judiciary.
This “wall” first formed by the executive bureaucracy stemmed from a series of
misinterpretations of the FISA statute and subsequent policies. These misinterpretations
lead to serious problems of intelligence gathering within the intelligence community.
Congress had created the “primary purpose” standard in order to prevent authorities from
52

53

Hoffman, “Litigating Terrorism.”

Richard Henry Seamon and William Dylan Gardner. “The Patriot Act and the Wall Between
Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. 28 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 319. (Spring, 2005).

19
using FISA to “circumvent traditional criminal warrant requirements.” 54 Yet the
Department of Justice took a stringent interpretation of FISA; federal prosecutors were
not allowed to control or direct the collection of FISA investigations and the FBI—not
federal prosecutors—had sole discretion in what information the Justice Department
could view. In 1995, further policies established by then Attorney General Janet Reno
again “were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied.” 55 First, although the
new polices did not require it, the DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy Review became the
sole gatekeeper for passing information through Justice Department channels. OIPR and
FBI leadership pressured the agents into building further barriers between agents working
on intelligence gathering and agents working on criminal investigations. These
restrictions lead to the practice of restricting information from criminal investigators even
when no FISA procedures had been used. 56
This divide in the sharing of information between intelligence agents and law
enforcement officials continued to be the norm until the entire system of foreign
intelligence gathering was reviewed in the wake of the tragic events of September 11th. In
response to the “pervasive problems” 57 evident in the intelligence community that led up
to the attacks in New York City and Washington D.C., Congress passed the controversial
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. The many changes that the PATRIOT Act incorporated
included the breaking down of the bureaucratic wall that separated the sharing of
intelligence. In relation to FISA, the PATRIOT Act attempted to break down this wall by
54

The 9/11 Commission Report. Pg 78.

55

Ibid.

56

Ibid. Pg 79.

57

Ibid. Pg xvi.
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amending FISA’s “primary purpose” standard to a “significant purpose” standard. This
change was the result of a compromise between those at Justice who wanted the “primary
purpose” standard revoked and those who supported the original form of the FISA
procedure. 58 This compromise allowed for shared information between intelligence
officers and law enforcement agents within their respective investigations and also
allowed for the use of FISA surveillance in criminal proceedings.
Reconsideration of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act was challenged
within the federal courts, although subsequent rulings supported to its constitutionality.
The first notable case took place in 1984, before the amendments of the PATRIOT Act.
In United States v. Duggan, the defendant—a member of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army—was convicted on charges of transporting explosives via interstate commerce that
would be used to kill, injure or intimidate individuals. A FISA Court order was issued to
allow electronic surveillance of the individual and his accomplices. The defendant
challenged his conviction, arguing first that FISA’s definition of foreign power is too
broad and thus deprives him due process of the law, and that it violates the probable
cause standard within the Fourth Amendment. 59 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit ruled that the definition was not too broad and that the probable cause
standard in FISA is constitutional because, as the surveillance falls under the umbrella of
national security, an adequate balance between a legitimate need of the government and
the protected rights of citizens was struck within FISA’s language. 60
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The second case to be examined occurred after the amendments of the PATRIOT
Act and dealt with the Act’s changes to the original FISA “primary purpose” standard.
This case took place within FISA’s judicial structure as it was the first published opinion
of the FISA Court of Review. This court was established in the original statute as the
government’s only means of appeal when a FISA Court order request is denied. In this
case, the original FISA Trial Court judge denied a request by the government and stated
that the “primary purpose” test still had to be met within the FISA statute. The FISA
Court of Review, in its first ever issued opinion, In re Sealed, ruled for the government,
stating that the PATRIOT Act had lowered the test to a “significant purpose” standard.
The FISA Court of Review also rejected the argument of amici curiae that it was
constitutionally necessary to keep intelligence investigations separate from law
enforcement investigations. 61 The Court of Review considered the wall constructed
between federal intelligence agents and law enforcement agents as a bureaucratic
misinterpretation of FISA. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated
with the prosecution of foreign intelligence crimes. 62
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEFENDING THE FISA COURT

With the passage of FISA and the subsequent appellate court decisions defending
its constitutionality, Congress and the judiciary had sealed the last remaining avenue for
the executive to engage in electronic surveillance without a court order. However, with
the development of current events, debate has arisen as to whether or not electronic
surveillance laws and practices adequately protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Arguments are levied on both sides; some defend recent practices, such as the NSA’s
controversial Terrorist Surveillance Program, that go outside the bounds of FISA and
Title III law, while other legal scholars attack the post PATRIOT Act FISA procedures as
infringing on citizens’ constitutional rights. Yet with a careful examination of the
jurisprudence surrounding recent electronic surveillance laws, an adequate balance can be
found. This balance of national security and individual, constitutional rights is achieved
when the only means of domestic electronic surveillance are Title III warrants and post
PATRIOT Act FISA Court orders. Any programs, such as the NSA’s Terrorist
Surveillance Program, which do not conform to the established Title III or FISA
procedures, unduly infringe on the civil liberties of United States citizens and are
therefore outside the grounds of the Constitution.
Before this paper continues in its argument that, currently, the executive branch’s
Terrorist Surveillance Program is unconstitutional, it must be conceded that the post
PATRIOT Act FISA Court is not an acceptable institution to some legal scholars with
regards to the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in order to argue that a constitutional balance of
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civil liberties and national security can be reached, this paper must accomplish three
tasks: first it must mount an adequate defense of the FISA Court; then it must show that
the Terrorist Surveillance Program intruded on Fourth Amendment protections by
violating important constitutional checks and balances; finally, solutions must be
examined which would make sure that future abuses of executive power in the realm of
electronic surveillance is minimized.
Legal scholars tend to have four main contentions with the constitutionality of the
FISA Court: first, many assert that the lack of public proceedings and notification
requirements are contrary to the Constitution; second, many argue that the different
probable cause standard is unreasonable within the context of the Fourth Amendment;
third, that the “wall” restricted shared intelligence is necessary to protect civil rights;
finally, many legal scholars argue that FISA Court orders allow for abuse of executive
power. This paper will examine all four main arguments and conclude that FISA Court
orders—while they do use standards different than Title III warrants—are still reasonable
within the Fourth Amendment.
Many organizations assert that FISA proceedings are secret and thus contrary to
the established system of open government. They claim that, in a democracy, judicial
procedures must remain within the public’s knowledge to insure the government is not
intruding on constitutional rights. 63 While public proceedings are an important part of
adhering to an open and legitimate form of government, there are many instances where
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public access is restricted for reasons of national security. Many aspects of society are
classified or restricted from public access; from certain bureaucratic regulatory hearings
to internal documents and classified intelligence, there are undoubtedly instances where
information cannot be publicly available. Yet national security or public interest claims
cannot counter all assertions of the need for open access to government. In fact, when this
discussion enters the realm of the Fourth Amendment, legal precedents often requires
public proceedings and notification requirements. Electronic surveillance is unique in
regards to other Fourth Amendment searches however, as the target of the surveillance
cannot be notified of the search until it is completed, or else the purpose of the
surveillance is mute. Therefore, when it comes to electronic surveillance, the Court has
consistently held that there is a legitimate government interest in restricting the public’s
access to certain proceedings and delaying the notification requirements. 64 This concept
of weighing government’s interest against the requirements in the Fourth Amendment
continues to hold its balance when examining FISA Court orders. The differences
between Title III electronic surveillance warrants and FISA Court orders are minimal
when it comes to public proceedings. Both proceedings are in camera and ex parte. Title
III procedures are sealed while FISA orders are classified. Thus both processes are
restricted from public access and both essentially have the same effect: because of the
inherent secrecy involved in electronic surveillance the government has a legitimate
interest in restricted public access.
There is one significant aspect of FISA Court orders that is not parallel to the
Title III procedures when it comes to notification. In the Title III procedure “all targets
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must receive notice … that they were the target of an electronic investigation. FISA only
requires notice to the target when the government intends to use the information as
evidence in trial against them.” 65 When analyzing the differences in these procedures,
two different balancing tests must be applied. First, in Title III warrants, the privacy
rights of a citizen to know when he or she has been the target of a search are balanced
against the government’s compelling interest in enforcing the law. Therefore, after the
search is completed, the government either has the choice to prosecute, and must then
disclose the evidence collected in the search, or must decide not to pursue charges, in
which case the government’s compelling interest to keep the citizen ignorant to the
search is mute. It follows that the only constitutionally acceptable avenue is notification.
In FISA Court orders, the standard shifts weight. The government—when it is opting not
to engage in a criminal prosecution—has a compelling interest to keep the search secret.
There is a fundamentally different purpose for FISA Court orders; whether criminal
prosecutions are involved or not, FISA orders are enacted to prevent threats posed to
national security. This fact, when balanced against a citizen’s right to be notified that a
search has taken place, is compelling enough for the information to remain secret.
Furthermore, while FISA Court orders do differ in the aspect of notification, this
standard is only different when the government is not planning to prosecute the subject of
the FISA surveillance. The government’s interest in protecting national security in
relation to the notification of electronic surveillance against foreign powers only
outweighs the rights of the agents of foreign powers when collecting intelligence. When
the government seeks to use electronic surveillance in the arena of law enforcement and
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seeks to initiate any criminal prosecution, the rights of the targeted foreign power then
trump the government’s need for secrecy. The government, if it desires to use FISA Court
information in a criminal procedure, must allow the defendant, and the defendant’s
attorneys, access to the information. 66 Clearly, when examining FISA procedures through
this balancing test, FISA Court orders meet the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment.
Public procedures and notification requirements are not the only contention with
the FISA Court. Some scholars also argue that the lessened probable cause standard used
to issue FISA Court orders violates the Fourth Amendment. 67 First, however, it is
important to note that case law is ambiguous as to whether or not FISA Court orders are
“warrants” as defined by the Fourth Amendment. Although the government argued that
they were in In re Sealed, the Court of Review stopped short of addressing the question.
The Court did, however, review the question of the reasonableness of FISA Court orders
and found them to meet the standards set by the Fourth Amendment. This conclusion is
not outside precedent as the Supreme Court has upheld many instances of reasonable
exceptions to the warrants clause.
In order to meet the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard both Title III
warrants and FISA Court orders have different probable cause standards. Title III
warrants require the government to show probable cause that a crime was committed or is
about to be committed. This is because the purpose of a Title III warrant is solely based
on enforcing the law. Thus, a person’s right to remain secure from an unreasonable
search is weighed against the government’s compelling interest to enforce the law. FISA
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Court orders, once again, require a different balance. A person’s right to remain secure
from an unreasonable search is now weighed against the government’s compelling
interest to protect national security. To examine this balance the purpose of Title III
warrants verse the purpose of FISA Court orders must again be examined. Title III
warrants are issued to collect evidence that a crime has been committed in order to
prosecute that crime. When working against terrorists, however, the government must act
to prevent terrorist actions. As one legal scholar states, “Title III … was crafted to punish
and deter normal crimes” whereas “FISA procedures … were specifically created to
prevents such crimes before they occur.” 68 This need to prevent terrorist activities shows
the government’s compelling interest to have a lessened probable cause standard, as
demonstrated in the Duggan case. Furthermore, it must be understood that this standard
only applies to a very narrow portion of the population. The government must
demonstrate probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power. Also, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s definition of an agent of a
foreign power is “rooted in criminal conduct,” 69 such as terrorism or espionage. Thus the
probable cause standard is similar to the Title III standard because both are based off
criminal actions. This standard is further narrowed when a citizen is targeted; the
government cannot base their evidence of probable cause solely on the target’s First
Amendment actions. 70
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Some legal scholars accept the fact that notification and probable cause standards
differ when the government’s interests in the surveillance change yet still assert the
current application of FISA is unconstitutional. They argue that the USA PATRIOT Act
altered the “primary purpose” standard set in the original version of FISA and thus
violated the wall between intelligence sharing and law enforcement. 71 These scholars
contend that that wall is a constitutional necessity rather than a bureaucratic
construction. 72 This contention, however, is contrary to the previous examination of the
jurisprudence surrounding the PATRIOT Act’s amendments to FISA. In In re Sealed, the
FISA Court of Review held that the primary purpose standard was not constitutionally
binding. 73 The government’s compelling interest in protecting national security still
allows for electronic surveillance of foreign powers when the government demonstrates
that a significant purpose of the surveillance is for foreign intelligence. Furthermore,
many legal scholars hold that the original interpretation of FISA by the Justice
Department that a wall should be constructed between intelligence agents and law
enforcement officers “has never had a statutory foundation and still lacks one.” 74 The
only contradictory precedent to this anaylisis is the pre-FISA case United States v.
Truong which first coined the “primary purpose” standard. Yet, because this case was “a
pre-FISA case that never analyzed the Fourth Amendment implications of a significant
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purpose test,” the Court of Review found it inapplicable. 75 “In other words, criminal
investigation can be used as the primary tool to fight foreign-based threats such as
terrorism or counterintelligence. Because Truong neglected this glaring reality, the court
concluded, Troung was neither binding nor persuasive in connection with FISA’s new
significant purpose test.” 76 Clearly, neither the “significant purpose” nor the “primary
purpose” tests erected a wall separating foreign intelligence gathering and prosecutorial
surveillance.
The FISA Court of Review did establish a standard to restrict the government’s
use of FISA orders that was mandated by the Fourth Amendment. The government must
“draw a line between ‘foreign intelligence crimes’ and ‘non-foreign intelligence crimes’”
in order to abide by FISA and the Fourth Amendment. 77 While statutory law is
ambiguous in this regard, it is a necessary component of FISA procedure. Finally, the
argument that constitutionality rests on whether surveillance is conducted for foreign
intelligence purposes or law enforcement purposes lacks logical foundation within the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens’ right to privacy when the
government conducts an unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, reasonableness is
dependent on the search, not on the use of the information obtained in the search. For
example, if the government were to wiretap an individual without any court approval, and
it was clearly not within any exceptions to court approval, then the unreasonable search
of the individual—and thus the violation of the Fourth Amendment—has already taken
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place, regardless of whether the government intends to use the information in trial.
Whether or not the information is to be used in a court proceeding is inconsequential; the
government need only show a significant purpose of foreign intelligence and the probable
cause to believe the target is a foreign power in order to use FISA authorized electronic
surveillance.
Clearly, the standards applied to FISA Court orders are reasonable when viewed
in their narrow context. The government can only use the lower standards in FISA when
probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power exists and
“generally speaking, FISA does not authorize secret surveillance of average American
citizens.” 78 Courts have held that these terms are not broad, and are in fact clearly defined
in the FISA statute. 79 Some legal scholars do contend, however, that FISA procedures
still allow for misuse by the executive branch. 80 Clearly, this view is unfounded, because
FISA uses the same check on executive power that is found in Title III warrants. The
safeguards that protect statutory violations of civil liberties are different in Title III and
FISA procedures, yet the safeguard that exists to protect against executive misuse of
electronic surveillance is the same in both procedures: judicial approval. Both FISA
orders and Title III warrants require the government to obtain approval from an
independent judicial authority. As with Title III procedures, if an adequate judicial check
on every one of the executive’s request to initiate electronic surveillance, then instances
of misuse by the government can be significantly minimized.
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CHAPTER FIVE: BREAKING WITH FISA LAW

Unfortunately the statutory status quo previously analyzed is not the de facto
situation that has occurred after September 11th. This paper will continue by analyzing
the Terrorist Surveillance Program and how it contrasts with decades of electronic
surveillance jurisprudence. Next it will be argued that if the administration was granted
blanket authorization to continue the TSP from a FISA Court judge, then the
administration is still acting outside the scope of the law. Finally, a number of
recommendations will be presented that—if implemented—will help to return, and to
keep, the actions of the executive branch back within legal realm of electronic
surveillance policy.
First publicly reported in the New York Times, in 2002 the President signed an
order secretly authorizing the National Security Agency to use electronic surveillance to
spy on individuals within the United States without first seeking approval from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 81 This program, though animatedly defended by
the Bush Administration, is criticized by many legal scholars as violating both statutory
and constitutional law. The Terrorist Surveillance Program continued despite criticism,
and not until January of 2007 did the administration announced TSP would now be under
the authority of the FISA Court. This recent shift in policy does not mean the program is
now within the boundaries of the law, however, as the “precise outlines of and legal
81
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justification for the monitoring remain unclear.” 82 While the administration has indicated
they plan to brief certain Senate Judiciary members on the changes, the administration
has failed to say whether the Terrorist Surveillance Program has been completely
eliminated, or whether a single FISA Court judge has given blanket authorization of the
program. Recent comments by the President seem to infer the latter: “the FISA court said
I did have the authority … it's important that they verify the legality of this program is it
means it's going to extend … yesterday was a very important day for the Terrorist
Surveillance Program. Nothing has changed in the program except for the court has said
… it is a legitimate way to protect the country.” 83 Regardless of the ambiguity, it is clear
that for over five years the administration circumvented the statutory laws regulating the
use of electronic surveillance.
It is clear that the justifications for the administration’s use of the TSP do not hold
up to thorough examination. Many scholars—as well as current and former government
officials—conclude “that the program is illegal.” 84 Several also argue that the motives
behind the TSP were to “circumvent FISA’s court-approval process with respect to
electronic surveillance that would be authorized by FISA and, almost certainly, to engage
in forms of surveillance that FISA prohibits.” 85 It is undoubtedly clear that this program
is contrary to federal court precedent because it allows for electronic surveillance on
domestic United States soil without judicial approval or any showing of probable cause.
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The administration still defends the legality of the program, however, and
believes the program is allowed under the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 86
Congress passed the AUMF just after the September 11th terrorist attacks, authorizing the
President “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against “persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2003.” 87 This Act, the administration argues, allows for the TSP because warrantless
surveillance is included in “all necessary and appropriate force.” Furthermore, the
administration argues that they are not acting outside of the scope of FISA. They also
contend that tacit judicial approval for the TSP is granted through the Supreme Court
case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 88
A significant number of legal scholars, as well as many government officials,
seriously disagreed with the administrations interpretation of the expansion of executive
power implied in the AUMF. On January 9, 2006 several of these scholars drafted a letter
to the Department of Justice outlining their contentions with the program and arguing that
the TSP was in violation of United States statutory and constitutional law. 89 The letter
outlined the why the administration’s defense of the Terrorist Surveillance Program does
not hold up to statutory law and legal precedent surrounding the use of electronic
surveillance. They argue that the implication that the AUMF allows for complete
warrantless wiretapping on domestic soil “directly contradicts express and specific
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language in” the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 90 FISA specifically states that
it—along with Title III wiretaps—are the “exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance … and the interception of domestic wire, oral and electronic
communications may be conducted.” 91 Clearly, for the administration to believe that the
ambiguous language in the AUMF overrides the specific procedures laid out in FISA is
completely unreasonable.
Even if Congress intended to repeal FISA with the AUMF, the scholars argue, the
evidence of such intent would, by case law precedent, have to be “overwhelming.” 92
Citing Morton v. Mancari (1974), they argue that, since the two statutes in conflict are
not “irreconcilable,” the evidence is not considered overwhelming enough for the
administration to legally infer the intent of Congress. 93 Clearly, based on precedent, the
administration could not legally infer Congress tacitly approved of the implementation of
the TSP. Furthermore, the legal scholars point out a serious contradiction in the
administration’s justification for the program. They first cite that the Attorney General
“has admitted that the administration did not seek to amend FISA to authorize the NSA
spying program because it was advised that Congress would reject such an
amendment.” 94 Clearly this is a blatant contradiction to their claims of tacit approval of
Congress; if the legislative branch had intended to approve of the Terrorist Surveillance
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Program in the AUMF, then the administration would not need to fear a possible
rejection from Congress.
Lastly, the legal scholars note that the only case law the administration uses to
defend the legality of the Terrorist Surveillance Program is the recently decided case
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. Yet this case held that, under the AUMF, the administration is only
allowed to hold enemy combatants captured on the battlefield, and in fact, it contradicted
the administration’s assertion that the AUMF allows for domestic use of force. The
Court’s narrow ruling in this case in no way justified the extension of the executive
branch’s electronic surveillance powers. It dealt entirely with Congress’s intent as it
applied to the literal battlefield of a foreign front, “it is another matter entirely to treat
unchecked warrantless domestic spying as included in that authorization.” 95 The Court
undoubtedly found that Congress had implied the power for the administration to hold
enemy combatants obtained on a foreign battlefield; yet for the administration to view
this ruling as an extension of executive electronic surveillance is unfounded.
While these contentions were raised as soon as the TSP was publicly announced,
the administration did not change their stringent support of the program until January
2007. As previously examined, the administration did bring the program under the
authority of the FISA Court. Yet this move brings new and difficult questions to the
table. It is unclear as to whether or not the FISA Court is examining every individual
request for surveillance under the TSP or whether the single FISA judge gave the
program blanket authorization. If the FISA Court judge did give the program
authorization in its entirety, then serious constitutional issues remain. First, a FISA Court
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judge has no statutory jurisdiction to authorize an entire surveillance program; the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act only allows FISA Court judges to rule on
individual cases concerning individual targets where the government has probable cause
to believe they are agents of a foreign power. From what is known of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, no protections exist to distinguish agents of foreign powers and
other U.S. persons. Furthermore, there is no real Article III protection for civil liberties
under this situation. Only individual evaluation of each wiretapping application by an
Article III judge can protect against Fourth Amendment violations. 96 Clearly, “the
terrorist surveillance program directly conflicts with the judicially sanctioned procedure
for conducting warrantless electronic surveillance” 97 and violates both statutory and
constitutional precedent.
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CONCLUSION

When analyzing other areas of government where electronic surveillance is used
for criminal investigations, it is clear that American society is wary of its extended use.
State governments have been quick to limit electronic surveillance by law enforcement.
While local legislatures have no jurisdiction over the use of federal wiretaps, most have
not significantly altered their own wiretapping laws in the post 9-11 era. While “New
York lawmakers broadened their wiretap laws to add terrorist activities to the list of
offenses police can investigate with electronic eavesdropping … only one other state—
Florida—is considering following New York’s lead.” 98 Furthermore, many states have
also extended the guidelines for their applications for electronic surveillance; some going
as far as limiting how many wiretaps are allowed in a given year, while others have even
restricted the use of information obtained in wiretaps in criminal court proceedings.99
More specifically, there are strong indications that the American public is wary of
the current administration’s decision to use the Terrorist Surveillance Program to
authorize warrantless wiretapping. A Los Angeles Times/Bloomberg Poll conducted in
April 2006 found a plurality of those polled considered the TSP an unacceptable way for
the federal government to investigate terrorists. A plurality of those polled also believed
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that the U.S. Senate should censure the President because of these actions. 100 This shows
that not only do a significant number of legal scholars believe that the Terrorist
Surveillance Program is unconstitutional but that the general American public—even in a
post 9-11 environment—is wary of the administration’s use of warrantless electronic
surveillance.
In order for this electronic surveillance system to revert back to the realm of
constitutionality, certain solutions must be implemented from policy makers in
Washington. Clearly, “the solution should come from legislation.” 101 Many legal scholars
assert that changes must be made in order to bring the system back under the proper
jurisdiction of the FISA Court. First, Congress must pass legislation which specifically
denies a single FISA Court judge from giving the TSP—or any similar program—blanket
authorization. The jurisdiction of any FISA Court judge should be reemphasized as only
dealing with individual requests for targets who the government can demonstrate
probable cause that the person is an agent of a foreign power. With such statutory
mandates, electronic surveillance policy would then return to the necessary constitutional
standard. Next, legislation must address the Terrorist Surveillance Program specifically;
it should either eliminate the program in its entirety or mandate that the process be
brought under the FISA Court and the procedure meet FISA standards. Next, if Congress
deems the National Security Agency needs more flexibility in its actions, legislators
should make sure any reforms are constitutional sound. Many legal scholars assert that
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changes could be made to expedite the FISA order process. 102 This could include
combining requests into one application yet giving FISA Court judges line item veto
power within their orders, or Congress could create different probable cause standards
which would align with legal precedent but would also give the NSA a different approach
to specific national security issues. 103 Lastly, Congress must begin—and continue—
rigorous oversight of the executive’s use of electronic surveillance programs. The desire
to keep information classified and out of Congress’s view cannot override Congress’s
important responsibility to act as a check on executive power. Only with these—or
similar—changes to the structure of electronic surveillance policy can the integrity and
legality of the system be recognized by the legal community.
Finally, some legal scholars argue that—regardless of the legality of the
program—national security cannot be put on hold for the possible infraction of civil
rights. One legal scholar contends that “for law-abiding citizens, the benefits of a secure
nation far outweigh the infrequent risks to one’s individual expectation of private
communications.” 104 This scholar, however, fails to see the necessity of the constitutional
safeguards which define the very structure of American government. The very system of
this government is founded on the idea that “law abiding” individuals should not fear
government intrusion, even if such intrusion is “infrequent.” Any need for national
security cannot overlook the letter of the law. In the case of electronic surveillance, an
acceptable constitutional balance between civil liberties and national security was
reached with the passage of FISA. Any extension of executive power that was invented
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by the notion of tacit Congressional approval clearly violations this important and fragile
constitutional balance.
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